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Since the beginning of the Crimean operation, it was difficult for many to find a term to define the 
way Russia conducted its operation. In the very beginning, some called it fourth generation warfare, 
referring to William Lind’s idea that warfare presents a generational evolution. The First Generation 
of Modern War (1648-1860) was marked by line and column tactics, and battles were formal and 
the battlefield was orderly. Its significance is the establishment of a military culture, resulting in the 
separation between “military” and “civilian”. The second generation surged as a development to 
address the contradiction between the military culture and the disorderliness of the battlefield. Its 
objective was attrition in a way that centrally-controlled firepower in synchrony with the infantry: 
the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies. The Third Generation was a development of the 
second, and is commonly known as the Blitzkrieg or maneuver warfare. Finally, the Fourth 
Generation represents a return of cultures being in conflict. The state loses the monopoly of 
violence and war, and finds itself fighting non-state adversaries (Lind 2004). Therefore, since 
Fourth Generation Warfare is basically about non-state actors fighting a culture war, this concept is 
too narrow to characterize the Russian way of conducting warfare. 
One of Putin’s closest advisors, Vladislav Surkov (under the pseudonym of Nathan Dubovitsky) 
coined the term “Non-Linear Warfare” in an article describing what would be the Fifth World War, 
the one where all fight against all (Dubovitsky 2014). The idea is that traditional geo-political 
paradigms no longer hold. Therefore, the Kremlin may gamble with the idea that old alliances like 
the European Union and NATO are less valuable then the economic interests it has with Western 
companies. Also, many Western countries welcome obscure financial flows form the post-Soviet 
space, as part of their own mode of economic regulation. Therefore, the Kremlin believes this 
means that Russian can get away with aggression (Pomerantsev 2014). Although this concept may 
explain Russia's idea of a war of civilizations (Vladimirov 2012), it fails to reflect the way it is 
conducting warfare. 
The most accepted term for referring to Russian New Generation Warfare is Hybrid Warfare. 
NATO itself has adopted it. The seminal work about Hybrid Warfare is Hoffman’s “Hybrid 
Warfare and Challenges”. The author developed the idea that a hybrid strategy is based on tactically 
employing a mix of instruments, resulting in being difficult to fully understand and establish a 
proper strategy to deal with it. The main challenge results from state and non-state actors employing 
technologies and strategies that are more appropriate for their own field, in a multi-mode 
confrontation. It may include exploiting modern capabilities to support insurgent, terrorist, and 
criminal activities, the use of high-tech military capabilities, combined with terrorist actions and 
cyber warfare operations against economic and financial targets (Hoffman 2009). Therefore, it still 
largely presupposes the application of kinetic force, thus of military power to defeat the enemy. 
A last and one more attempt to call New Generation Warfare something else was a paper published 
on the Journal of Slavic Military Thought by Jonsson and Seely (2015). They proposed to call it 
“Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict”. 
There are two problems. First, all these approaches still presuppose the application of kinetic force. 
Russian New Generation Warfare does not. Second, it is a conceptual mistake to try to fit Russian 
New Generation Warfare, the result of a long military academic discussion, on Western concepts. 
The word hybrid is catchy, since it may represent a mix of anything. However, since as military 
concept it is the result of American military thought, its basic framework differs from the one 
developed by the Russians. Therefore, it is a methodological mistake to frame a theory developed 
independently by the Russian military within a theory reflecting other culture, way of thinking, and 
strategic understanding about the way of conducting warfare. 
Also, an often ignored aspect of the Russian military art is the idea of asymmetry in warfare. As 
Vladimir Putin put himself already in 2006, “Quantity is not the end (…) Our responses are to be 
based on intellectual superiority. They will be asymmetrical and less expensive, but will certainly 
improve the reliability of our nuclear triad” (Putin 2006). In its classic definition, asymmetry is the 
strategy of a weaker opponent to fight a stronger adversary. The main idea is, as Clausewitz put it, 
that war “(…) is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political 
intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means. (...) The political design is the object, while 
war is the means, and the means can never be thought of apart from the object” (Clausewitz 2000, 
p. 280). As a result, since the objective of war is to achieve political objectives, the instruments of 
warfare may be military or non-military. This means that a direct attack followed by territorial 
occupation and annexation might not be necessary, therefore warfare may be direct, indirect, or 
both at the same time. 
Russia’s campaign against Ukraine is the operationalization of a well-orchestrated operation of 
asymmetric warfare, using direct and indirect, and linear and non-linear tactics, mixed with 
symmetric methods, at the same time using clear political, psychological, and information 
strategies. It is the fully operationalization of “New Generation Warfare”. Its success can be 
measured by the fact that in just three weeks, and without a shot being fired, the morale of the 
Ukrainian military was broken and all of their 190 bases had surrendered. Instead of relying on a 
mass deployment of tanks and artillery, the Crimean campaign deployed less than 10,000 assault 
troops – mostly naval infantry, already stationed in Crimea, backed by a few battalions of airborne 
troops and Spetsnaz commandos – against 16,000 Ukrainian military personnel. After blocking 
Ukrainian troops in their bases, the Russians started the second operational phase, consisting of 
psychological warfare, intimidation, bribery, and internet/media propaganda to undermine 
resistance, thus avoiding the use of firepower.  
The objective of this paper is to analyze the Russian military literature to present the theoretical 
evolution of the concept of New Generation Warfare. It presents a clear conceptual evolution from 
the first time the term appeared until the concept of Network Centric Warfare was merged with 
Asymmetric Warfare as Russian New Generation Warfare’s formative elements. It analyzes the 
works on the subject of Chichkan, Velesov, Kononov, Tsygichko, Kuralenko, Dulnev, Slipchenko, 
Vladimirov, Gerasimov, Chekinov, Bogdanov, and others. The paper then presents a schematization 
of the theoretical findings, first proposing a general formalization of phases of New Generation 
Warfare and, second, presenting its operational schematization. It follows a discussion of the results 
in the shadow of the war in Ukraine, and its implications for the European security.  
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